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Abstract The common property problem, ﬁrst analyzed in the context of overﬁshing (Gor-
don, 1954), is ubiquitous: independent tax authorities will overtax the same base (Berkowitz
and Li, 2000), and independent researchers will exert excessive eﬀort to make the same
breakthrough (Wright, 1983). We propose a “Partnership Solution” to this common prop-
erty problem. Each of n players maximizes his payoﬀ by joining a partnership in the ﬁrst
stage and by choosing his eﬀort at the second stage. Under the rules of a partnership,
each member must pay his own cost of eﬀort but receives an equal share of the partner-
ship’s revenue. The incentive to free ride created by such partnerships can be beneﬁcial
since it naturally oﬀsets the incentive to exert excessive eﬀort inherent in common property
problems. In our two-stage game, this institutional arrangement can, under speciﬁed cir-
cumstances, induce socially optimal eﬀort in a subgame-perfect equilibrium: no one has a
unilateral incentive (1) to switch partnerships (or create a new partnership) in the ﬁrst stage
or (2) to deviate from socially optimal eﬀort in the second stage. Not all consequences of
partnerships are so benign. Cartel members can use partnerships to solve their “problem”
of excessive output so as to achieve monopoly proﬁts; inﬁnitely-repeated interactions are
unnecessary. Service professionals frequently organize themselves into such partnerships
as do plywood producers and crews on ﬁshing vessels. In Japan, crews of diﬀerent ﬁsh-
ing vessels sometimes form partnerships to share their revenues (Platteau and Seki, 2000),
reportedly for the reasons we analyze.
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11 Introduction
If N individuals independently exploit a common property resource, aggregate eﬀort will
be excessive because of congestion externalities. If, on the other hand, everyone must
share the fruits of his labor equally with the other N − 1 individuals, aggregate eﬀort will
be insuﬃcient because of free-riding. Each of these two extremes is a special case of the
following arrangement: players partitioned into partnerships simultaneously choose eﬀort
levels, with each partnership’s share of aggregate revenue equal to its share of aggregate
eﬀort and every member of each partnership required to share equally with his colleagues
the gross revenue he brings in. In the ﬁrst of the extremes above, there are N “solo”
partnerships while in the second, there is 1 “grand” partnership to which all N individuals
belong.
Since too little eﬀort occurs when there is 1 partnership and too much eﬀort occurs when
there are N partnerships, one might expect that aggregate eﬀort increases with the number
of partnerships. We verify this conjecture analytically and Schott et. al. (2005 ) verify it
experimentally. Socially optimal eﬀort can, therefore, be induced (or approximated if there
are integer problems) by dividing the N players exogenously into an intermediate number
of partnerships in such a way that each agent’s tendency to work too hard is exactly oﬀset
by his tendency to free ride. We refer to this as the “Partnership Solution.”1
In reality, of course, the Partnership Solution is viable if and only if a person assigned
to a given group has no incentive to switch to some other partnership (pre-existing or new).
We refer to such partnerships as “stable.” We investigate the stability of the Partnership
1While Kandel and Lazear (1992) emphasized that the free-riding inherent in partnerships is a problem
to be overcome, Schott(2001) was the ﬁrst to recognize that, in the context of common property, free-riding
may be part of the solution. In particular, he introduced the idea of grouping users of a common-property
resource into an optimal number of independent output-sharing partnerships. He did not investigate the
stability of these partnerships nor did he show that partnerships can also solve the cartel’s problem of
excessive output.
2Solution in a two-stage game where partnerships are formed at the ﬁrst stage and eﬀort is
chosen simultaneously at the second stage. Whether a partnership is stable or not turns out
to depend on the advantages of team production over solo production. This follows since
the principal source of ﬁrst-stage instability is going into business for oneself.
Since common-property problems are ubiquitous, our Partnership Solution has many
potential applications. While environmental problems (overﬁshing, excessive hunting, ex-
cessive pumping of water or oil) come immediately to mind, common-property problems
arise in other situations as well. When many researchers independently work to make the
same discovery, there is excessive research eﬀort due to the negative externalities that each
researcher imposes on the others. If researchers were grouped into stable “research part-
nerships” and paid a share of revenues rather than a wage, the problem of excessive eﬀort
could be attenuated much as it is on ﬁshing vessels where the entire crew shares the catch.2
Similarly, when many tax authorities independently tax the same base, there is excessive
taxation due to the negative externalities that each imposes on the others. If tax authori-
ties grouped themselves into stable partnerships and had to share what they collected while
bearing their own collection costs, the problem of excessive taxation could be resolved.3
Indeed our Partnership Solution applies to other collective action problems besides the
common-property problem—some of which we might prefer to leave unsolved. Consider a
homogeneous cartel which operates over a ﬁnite horizon under complete information. Under
such circumstances, Cournot proﬁts are predicted to occur in every period since any scheme
to collect higher proﬁts would unravel from the end. But if the ﬁrms in an industry were
partitioned into stable partnerships (a common form of organization within some service
2Wright (1983), among others, has shown that competition to make a discovery results in excessive
research activity due to a congestion externality “equivalent to that noted by H. Scott Gordon (1954) with
respect to ﬁshing.” Wright (p. 694) credits Usher (1964) as the ﬁrst to note the equivalence between these
two problems but lists many contributors to the literature on inventive activity who have emphasized its
common-property aspect.
3In their analysis of multiple tax authorities in Russia, Berkowitz and Li (2000) point out that the tax
base is a common property resource and the excessive taxation is a “tragedy of the commons.”
3industries) enough free-riding could be induced within each partnership to elevate industry
proﬁts to the monopoly level without any need for complex, history-dependent strategies
over an unbounded horizon. This would be one potential explanation for the existence of
the partnership as an organizational form.
A more benign explanation for partnerships has recently been advanced by Levin and
Tadelis (2004). They show that a ﬁrm’s choice to organize as a partnership instead of
a corporation can reassure consumers unable to observe the quality of a service prior to
purchase that a ﬁrm’s employees are of high quality. To isolate this eﬀect, they assume that
members of the applicant pool diﬀer in their intrinsic quality; as a simpliﬁcation, Levin and
Tadelis assume that each individual works equally hard in any organizational environment
regardless of the incentives he faces. While their elegant model clearly captures one reason
why ﬁrms choose to organize as partnerships, it cannot explain why ﬁshermen share their
catch, why plywood employees (Craig and Pencavel, 1992) share their revenues, or why
wait-staﬀ share their tips.
The motives of the ﬁshermen of Toyama Bay who for nearly half a century have formed
groups which pool their revenues (net of some costs) has been investigated empirically in
two fascinating articles by Platteau, Seki, and Carpenter (Platteau and Seki (2000) and
Carpenter and Seki (2004)). Since 1992, the ﬁshermen have divided into 5 partnerships:
the crews of seven vessels have constituted one partnership, the crews of two vessels have
constituted a second partnership, and the crews of each of the remaining three vessels
have constituted the other three partnerships (each sharing the catch of its own vessel).
As Plateau and Seki (2000) emphasize, these ﬁshermen are relatively homogeneous: they
come from the same region, use the same technology to catch the same prey (Japanese
glass shrimp or “shiroebi”) and market it through the same cooperative. To identify the
beneﬁts they derive from partnerships, Platteau and Seki interviewed the skippers of the
12 boats and, when feasible, used more objective measures to validate their responses. It
4turns out that partnerships are not formed for insurance purposes: “The most prominent
result emerging from this exercise is certainly the fact that stabilization of incomes was
not mentioned a single time by the 12 skippers interviewed.” Instead, the main motive is
to reduce congestion: “The desire to avoid the various costs of crowding while operating
in attractive ﬁshing spots appears as the main reason stated by Japanese ﬁshermen for
adopting pooling arrangements.” The ﬁshermen also mentioned that by sharing catch and
reducing excessive eﬀort, they can obtain higher prices: “Fishermen believe that by limiting
eﬀort they can cause ﬁsh prices to rise.” Statistical analysis of price data conﬁrmed this
eﬀect. These shiroebi ﬁshermen are hardly unique. There were 147 such ﬁshing groups in
Japan that engaged in some form of pooling as of the census of 1988.
Our goal is to identify the circumstances when such partnership solutions would be
(1) advantageous to participants and (2) stable. To do so, we assume that each worker
chooses his eﬀort level to maximize his payoﬀ and hence responds to eﬀort incentives. As
a simpliﬁcation, appropriate in the case of the Toyama Bay ﬁshermen, we assume that
workers are homogeneous. This pair of assumptions provides a useful complement to Levin-
Tadelis’s analysis, which assumes instead no response to eﬀort incentives but heterogeneity.4
Our analysis should be of interest both to regulators attempting to solve common-property
problems and to anti-trust authorities trying to thwart collusion.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our notation, deﬁne the goal of socially
optimal eﬀort, and discuss the determinants of equilibrium eﬀort in the second-stage of our
game. In Section 3, we provide conditions suﬃcient for the Partnership Solution to be
stable. Section 4 generalizes the analysis to account for situations where some costs are
shared and where agents have market power; it also shows how partnerships can be used to
improve everyone’s payoﬀ even when they cannot attain the ﬁrst-best. Section 5 concludes
4Also see Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) for other examples of partnerships and an analysis of partnerships
using cooperative game theory.
5the paper.
2 Decentralization in a Two-Stage Partnership Game
To begin, we deﬁne the notation that will be used throughout this paper.
mi = number of members of group i
xik= eﬀort level of agent k in group i
Y −k
i = aggregate eﬀort level of members of group i other than agent k
X−i= aggregate eﬀort of other groups
X = total eﬀort level (sum of all agents’ eﬀorts)
f(X) = aggregate production function
c = constant marginal cost of eﬀort
n = number of groups
N = total number of agents
A(·) =
f(X)
X = average product
¯ xik = (xi+Y −k
i )
mi = mean eﬀort level in group i
Until Section 4, we make the assumption standard in the common-property literature that
the price of output is a constant (normalized to unity). In addition, we assume that (1)
A(X) is bounded, strictly positive, strictly decreasing, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable;
(2) A(0) − c > 0; and (3) the Novshek (1985) condition, A0(X) + XA00(X) < 0, holds for
all X ≥ 0.
Socially optimal eﬀort (X∗ = argmax X(A(X) − c)) must satisfy the following ﬁrst-
order condition:
6A(X∗) + X∗A0(X∗) − c = 0. (1)
Since the Novshek condition holds, X∗ is unique. This aggregate eﬀort level is the goal we
seek to achieve by decentralization through our Partnership Solution.
In the ﬁrst stage of our two-stage game, agents choose a partnership to which to belong.
Let n ≤ N denote the number of distinct groups speciﬁed by the agents and index these
groups i = 1,...,n. Then, in the second stage, agents simultaneously choose their eﬀort
after observing each agent’s choice of group.5 To verify that the partnership solution is
subgame-perfect, we must show that it forms a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. We
approach this through backwards induction, considering the problem of eﬀort choice ﬁrst.
2.1 Equilibrium Eﬀort Choice in Second-Stage Subgames
Consider second-period subgames in which individuals grouped into partnerships simulta-
neously choose their eﬀort levels.
An individual in group i would choose his own eﬀort level (xik) taking as given the
aggregate eﬀort level of his colleagues in partnership i (Y −k
i =
P
l6=k xil) as well as the
aggregate eﬀort levels of the other partnerships (X−i). Hence, he would maximize
πik = Max
xik
(
1
mi
"
xik + Y −k
i
xik + Y −k
i + X−i
#
· f(xik + Y −k
i + X−i) − cxik
)
,
where mi is the number of partners in his group.This is equivalent to maximizing:
miπik =

xik + Y −k
i

· A

xik + Y −k
i + X−i

− micxik. (2)
5The assumption that agents observe the composition of their partnership before exerting eﬀort seems
plausible; however, it is not innocuous. If eﬀort choices had to be made without observing the partnership
partition, then there would be no pure-strategy Nash Equilibria.
7To ﬁnd the best response of member k in partnership i, we diﬀerentiate the objective
function (2) with respect to xik and substitute X = xik + Y −k
i + X−i to arrive at the
following N ﬁrst-order conditions:
A(X) +

xik + Y −k
i

· A0 (X) − cmi = 0 for i = 1,...,n and k = 1,...,mi. (3)
Each ﬁrst-order condition in (3) clariﬁes why player i reduces his eﬀort in a multiperson
partnership compared to his eﬀort operating solo, for unchanged eﬀort of the other N − 1
players. There are two eﬀects, each of which leads him to reduce his eﬀort: the “internaliza-
tion eﬀect” and the “diversion-of-beneﬁts eﬀect.” First, since in a multiperson partnership,
player i receives a share of the receipts generated by his partners, he would refrain from
imposing as large a negative externality on them as he would if he operated solo. That
is, the ﬁrst factor in the second term is larger by Y −k
i than it would be if he operated
solo. This “internalization eﬀect” would induce him to reduce his eﬀort in a multiperson
partnership even if c = 0 but the eﬀect would disappear if under the rules of the partnership
he received nothing from his partners. Second, since in a multiperson partnership, player i
must relinquish a share of the beneﬁts of his eﬀort but must pay the full cost of generating
them, he would reduce his eﬀort. That is, the second factor in the last term is mi > 1
times as large as it would be if he were operating solo. This “diversion-of-beneﬁts eﬀect”
would persist even if his partners were not, like him, required to share their own beneﬁts
but would disappear if c = 0.
The N =
Pn
i=1 mi ﬁrst-order conditions in (3) plus the two equations deﬁning Y −k
i and
X in terms of the individual eﬀort levels (xik) determine the N eﬀort levels and these two
8aggregates.6 Rewriting the ﬁrst factor of the second term in terms of ¯ xi gives us:
A(X) + mi¯ xi · A0 (X) − cmi = 0, for i = 1,...,n. (4)
These n equations plus the equation X =
Pn
i=1 mi¯ xi uniquely determine the n mean eﬀort
levels {¯ xi}n
i=1 and X. We can solve (4) for ¯ xi, the mean eﬀort level in group i:
¯ xi =

1
−A0(X)

A(X)
mi
− c

. (5)
2.2 Partnership Eﬀects on Eﬀort Choice
If partnerships of diﬀerent sizes form at the ﬁrst stage, then their mean eﬀort levels will
diﬀer at the second stage. In particular,
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium, strictly larger groups have strictly smaller mean eﬀort
levels.
Proof: As (5) reﬂects, the strictly positive mean eﬀort level at the ith partnership can
be represented as the product of two positive factors. The second factor will be smaller at
a partnership with a larger number of members (mi) while the ﬁrst factor will be the same
for all the partnerships. Hence, the larger the partnership the smaller the mean eﬀort.
Intuitively, the larger the group, the more free-riding occurs within it.
Next we verify that aggregate eﬀort in the second-stage depends only on the number (n)
of groups formed at the ﬁrst stage and not on the distribution of agents among the diﬀerent
groups:
6In this model, aggregate eﬀort within each partnership is uniquely determined but individual eﬀort
within each partnership is indeterminate. To understand why, consider any solution to the N +2 ﬁrst-order
conditions. If the eﬀort within any partnership is reassigned internally without aﬀecting the partnership’s
aggregate eﬀort, then each of these N + 2 equations still holds. Intuitively, such a reassignment does not
aﬀect anyone’s marginal incentives to alter his eﬀort unilaterally. An expansion in eﬀort still has the same
marginal cost (c) and, since it still has the same eﬀect on the total eﬀort of the group and the same eﬀect
on the aggregate eﬀort of all groups, it has the same marginal beneﬁt as before the reassignment.
9Proposition 2 Aggregate eﬀort (X) in the second stage depends only on the number of
groups formed in the ﬁrst stage and not on the size of those groups.
Proof: Adding together the n ﬁrst-order conditions in (4), we obtain the following condi-
tion:7
nA(X) + XA0(X) − cN = 0. (6)
Thus aggregate eﬀort (X) induced in the Nash equilibria of second-stage subgames depends
only on the number of groups formed at the ﬁrst stage and not on the speciﬁc partition. 
A monotonic relationship exists between the number of partnerships formed at the ﬁrst
stage and the aggregate eﬀort expended at the second stage.
Proposition 3 The larger the number of groups formed at the ﬁrst stage, the larger the
aggregate eﬀort level at the second stage.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating (6) implicitly, we obtain:
dX
dn
=
A(X)
−[(n + 1)A0(X) + XA00(X)]
> 0,
where the inequality follows from A(X) > 0,A0(X) < 0, and the Novshek condition.
Since aggregate eﬀort in our game is a continuous function of the number of groups formed
at the ﬁrst stage and since n = 1 induces too little aggregate eﬀort and n = N generates too
much, some unique intermediate number of groups will (if we provisionally ignore integer
constraints) induce the socially optimal level of eﬀort at the second stage. We can ﬁnd this
number by plugging X∗ into (6) and then solving for n∗.
Proposition 4 If n∗ =
c(N−1)
A(X∗) + 1 groups form at the ﬁrst stage, then the aggregate eﬀort
chosen in the Nash equilibrium of the second stage will be socially optimal.
7Our proposition reinterprets the result in Bergstrom and Varian (1985) that, in an interior equilibrium
of a Cournot oligopoly model with constant marginal costs, aggregate output depends only on the sum of
the marginal costs.
10Proof: Substitute n∗ =
c(N−1)
A(X∗) + 1 and X∗ into (6). This gives us:

c(N − 1)
A(X∗)
+ 1

A(X∗) + X∗A0(X∗) − cN = 0.
Simplifying, we obtain:
A(X∗) + X∗A0(X∗) − c = 0
which is the same as (1), the condition deﬁning X∗.
Proposition 4 implies that whenever c = 0, the social optimum is achieved by putting
everyone in a single partnership (n = 1). For suppose everyone is in a single partnership
and exerting an Nth of the optimal aggregate eﬀort. If any individual varied his eﬀort in
either direction, his costs would remain zero, the revenues that he contributes to the pool
would change but the revenues his partners would contribute to the pool would change
by an exactly oﬀsetting amount (since there could be no ﬁrst-order change in aggregate
producer surplus). The individual would, therefore, have no incentive to deviate.
Contrast this with the case where c > 0. In that case, the social optimum cannot be
supported by putting everyone in a single partnership since this same individual would
now have a strict incentive to decrease his eﬀort; for contracting eﬀort would lower his
costs without any ﬁrst-order change in his gross revenues. As illustrated below, when
c > 0 the social optimum is achieved with more than one partnership. For then, if an
individual unilaterally increases his eﬀort the revenues obtained by his own partnership
must strictly increase (exactly oﬀsetting the revenue decrease experienced by each of the
other partnerships) by enough that his share of his partnership’s gain exactly oﬀsets his
additional cost.
To illustrate, suppose that N = 12 players earn their livelihood working in an activity
plagued by a congestion externality. Assume aggregate production (and hence aggregate
revenue) is f(X) = 19X − X2, where X represents aggregate eﬀort. Suppose that the cost
per unit of eﬀort is c = 3. It is straightforward to see that the socially optimal eﬀort level
11is X∗ = 8. Since N = 12, then Proposition 4 implies that:
n∗ =
3(11)
19 − 8
+ 1 = 4.
That is, if the 12 players divide into 4 partnerships, then the resulting aggregate eﬀort will
be socially optimal. If n∗ is not an integer, the Partnership Solution can only approximate
the maximum social surplus.8 Henceforth, we assume that n∗ is an integer.
3 Equilibrium Partnership Choice in the First Stage
To implement the Partnership Solution, consider the following two-step procedure:
1. Step 1
Partition the N players into n∗ groups in such a way that no two groups diﬀer in size
by more than one member.9
2. Step 2
Recommend that every player observe the number of groups which form at the ﬁrst
stage, use (6) to compute the aggregate eﬀort expected in the second stage, and then
set his own eﬀort level equal to the mean eﬀort of his group as given in (4).
No player would have an incentive to deviate unilaterally from the recommendation in
Step 2 since he would anticipate that the others are making the recommended eﬀorts then
8Suppose in the previous example that N = 8 instead. As before, X
∗ = 8 but now n
∗ =
32
11 = 2.91.
There are two possible integer solutions, n = 2 or n = 3. If n = 3, then we ﬁnd that X = 8.25 which yields
a social product of 63.94, while if n = 2 then X = 4.67 and the social product is 52.89. So n = 3 is optimal
given the integer constraint. Setting n = 3 allows society to obtain 99.9% of the maximal social product,
while only 40% can be achieved under the common property solution (where n = N).
9This can always be done. We simply compute the number of members in the smallest group by taking
the largest integer, Q ≤
N
n∗. If
N
n∗ is an integer, then all groups will have Q members. If
N
n∗ is not an integer,
there will be a remainder of R < n
∗ people left over, each of whom can be assigned to a diﬀerent group.
There will then be n
∗ − R groups, each with Q members, and R groups, each with Q + 1 members. For a
concrete analogy to dealing playing cards sequentially, see footnote 13.
12and these recommendations form a Nash equilibrium.
But does any agent have an incentive to deviate in the ﬁrst stage from the partnership
to which he is assigned given that he anticipates sharing the workload of that partnership
equally at the second stage? If not, we will have established one way to implement the
Partnership Solution. If so, we will have established that the Partnership Solution cannot
be implemented. For, in that case, the Partnership Solution also can not be implemented
with partners making asymmetric eﬀorts.10
Deviations at the ﬁrst stage fall into two categories: (1) an agent can abandon the
colleagues in his prescribed group for the members of some other group or (2) he can
abandon his prescribed group to go into business for himself. As the following proposition
shows, the ﬁrst type of deviation is never advantageous.
Proposition 5 If groups diﬀer in size by at most one member, then no one can strictly
improve his payoﬀ by joining another group.
Proof: First note that, from Proposition 2, a deviation which maintains the number of
groups formed at the ﬁrst stage will not alter aggregate eﬀort (X∗) exerted at the second
stage. Second, assuming homogeneous eﬀort within groups (as discussed above), note that
the payoﬀ to each player in group i (πi) is:11
πi = ¯ xi(A(X∗) − c). (7)
This is strictly increasing in ¯ xi since A(X∗) − c > 0. Each member’s payoﬀ is larger in
groups with a larger mean level of eﬀort. Proposition 1 tells us that a group with a smaller
number of members will have a larger mean eﬀort since its smaller size will discourage
10Consider a partition of the players into k partnerships. This uniquely determines the aggregate eﬀort
level of every partnership and hence the gross revenue of the members of each partnership. An individual
in partnership i will receive t he same gross revenue no matter how aggregate eﬀorts are distributed within
any of the k partnerships. However, his payoﬀ equals the common gross revenue of his partnership less his
own eﬀort cost. Hence, if eﬀort were reallocated within his partnership so that he undertook more than his
share, he would have a stronger incentive to deviate.
11To see this, begin with the objective function (2) and see that, if player k makes eﬀort xik in a group
with mean eﬀort ¯ xi when aggregate eﬀort is X, then his payoﬀ is: πik = ¯ xiA(X) − cxik.
13free-riding. Hence, the only way to strictly increase one’s payoﬀ by defecting to another
group is to switch to a group which, even after the defector is added, is strictly smaller than
his original group. But there are no such opportunities to increase one’s payoﬀ if groups
initially diﬀer in size by at most one member.
Consider the second type of deviation: an agent deviates to form a new, singleton,
group. Whether this is proﬁtable or not depends upon the disadvantage of solo produc-
tion compared to team production. The literature on the theory of the ﬁrm identiﬁes the
disadvantages of organizing multi-agent ﬁrms. Such ﬁrms are rife with incentive problems
to which single-agent ﬁrms are immune. But, since multi-agent ﬁrms abound, there must
be a countervailing advantage to such arrangements—individuals working in teams must
be able to produce more output per man-hour than those working alone.12 Following the
literature on team production, therefore, we assume that a team can produce more than
an individual working by himself the same number of man-hours; in extreme cases, a team
may be necessary in order to produce at all.
Suppose that to duplicate the eﬀorts of 1 man-hour of team eﬀort, a single individual
must work 1/β hours, for β ∈ (0,1]. Then, if we continue to express eﬀort in man-hours of
team eﬀort, the marginal cost of eﬀort for an individual working alone would be 1
βc.
Partition the N players into n groups in such a way that no two groups diﬀer in size by
more than 1 member. For any n there is a unique partition that satisﬁes this restriction.13
In the case where some partnerships are one member larger than others, these larger part-
nerships will generate more free-riding in the equilibrium of the second stage (Proposition
1). Anticipating lower payoﬀs in the second stage, every member of a larger partnership
would have a stronger incentive to deviate to a solo partnership at the ﬁrst stage. Let
12Alchian and Demsetz (1972) were the ﬁrst to emphasize the importance of team production in the theory
of the multi-person ﬁrm and their insights have now percolated down to undergraduate treatments of that
theory. For an extensive discussion, consult the textbooks by Eaton et. al (Chapter 19, 2002) and Campbell
(Chapter 2.5, 1995).
13One might visualize dealing out N agents sequentially (as if they were cards in a deck) to each of n
partnerships until all N agents had been dealt out. At most, some partnerships would have one more agent
than other partnerships.
14g(n,β) denote the gain a member of a larger partnership would achieve by setting up his
own partnership. If g(n,β) ≤ 0 then he has no incentive to deviate and a fortiori neither
does any member of a smaller partnership; hence the partition under consideration is stable.
If, however, g(n,β) > 0 then he has an incentive to deviate and the partition under con-
sideration is unstable. By analyzing properties of the g(·,·) function, we show below that
for any n, including n∗, there is a unique β(n) ∈ (0,1] such that the Partnership Solution
is stable for all β ≤ β(n).
3.1 Team Production is Essential (β = 0)
In many applications, “it takes two workers to perform a given task” (Holmstrom and
Tirole, p. 67). That is, solo production is infeasible. For example, no matter how hard a
person works he/she cannot catch a whale by himself; nor can he/she stay awake every day
and night of his medical career to help patients with their medical emergencies. In other
applications deviating to solo groups may be illegal since many partnership agreements
contain ‘non-compete’ clauses which prevent an individual, when leaving a partnership,
from competing in the same market as the group he is leaving.14
Whenever solo production is infeasible, g(n,0) < 0 and we can conclude:
Proposition 6 When solo production is infeasible, the Partnership Solution solves the
common-property problem.
Proof: As we have veriﬁed, no unilateral deviation to an existing partnership is strictly
advantageous to any agent. Moreover, since g(n,0) < 0, no deviation to a solo partnership
is proﬁtable for any n, including n∗. 
14Various courts have upheld such clauses, including the Georgia Supreme Court in Rash v. Toccoa Clinic
Med. Assoc., 253 Ga. 322, 320 S.E.2d 170 (1984).
153.2 Solo Production Is Feasible (β ∈ (0,1])
If solo partnerships are legal and feasible, we must investigate further. Social welfare can
never be maximized as long as any solo partnership is involved. For, if there are any solo
partnerships, then even if in equilibrium optimal eﬀort (X∗) results, the cost of achieving
it will strictly exceed cX∗, which a planner could achieve just by assembling a team of all
N players and commanding that level of eﬀort. So we assume that n = 1,2,...,bN/2c
partnerships, where bZc denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to Z. For example,
if N = 15, there are at most b15/2c = 7 partnerships: six with two members and one with
three members.
Equation (6) implicitly deﬁnes the aggregate eﬀort which would result from n part-
nerships, each of which has two or more members. Denote the aggregate eﬀort implicitly
deﬁned by this equation as X(n). If X(bN/2c) ≥ X∗, then the Partnership Solution can
potentially achieve the ﬁrst best by generating more free riding and thereby bringing eﬀort
down toward X∗.
Denote the payoﬀ of a potential deviator, prior to his deviation, as πC and his payoﬀ
after going solo as πD. πC is independent of β. A partner who deviates, therefore, gains
g(n,β) = πD −πC. His gain from going solo, his eﬀort, everyone else’s eﬀort, and aggregate
eﬀort, will depend on the parameter β. Deﬁne β such that for any β > β, the deviator going
solo would make strictly positive eﬀort while for any smaller β he would make zero eﬀort.
When β ∈ [0,β], the deviator would receive a zero payoﬀ (πD = 0) following his deviation.
Hence, g(n,β) = g(n,0) = −πC < 0 for any β ∈ [0,β]. When β ∈ (β,1] the consequences
of one agent’s going solo are described by the four variables πD, X, X−1, and ¯ x1 which are
deﬁned by equations (8)-(11) below, where for simplicity we assign the index “1” to the
deviator’s solo partnership (and therefore denote his eﬀort as ¯ x1 and the aggregate eﬀort of
all others as X−1):
16πD = ¯ x1(A(X) −
c
β
) (8)
A(X) + ¯ x1A0(X) −
c
β
= 0 (9)
nA(X) + X−1A0(X) − (N − 1)c = 0 (10)
¯ x1 + X−1 = X. (11)
Equation (10) is obtained by adding up the ﬁrst-order conditions of the n original partner-
ships after eﬀort levels have adjusted in response to the deviation.
Proposition 7 g(n,β) is a continuous function of β for any β in (β,1).
Proof: Since πC is independent of β, it is suﬃcient to show that πD is continuous in β. Use
(11) to eliminate X from (8)-(10). Equation (10) does not involve β. Given the Novshek
condition, (n + 1)A0 + X−1A00 6= 0; therefore, the implicit function theorem insures that,
in a neighborhood of any solution (¯ x1,X−1,X) induced by β ∈ (β,1) we can write (10) as
X−1 = f(¯ x1) where f(·) is a continuous function with derivative f0 = −
nA0+X−1A00
(n+1)A0+X−1A00 ∈
(−1,0). Equation (9) does involve β. Replace X−1 in this equation by f(¯ x1). Given the
Novshek condition and A0 < 0, (1+f0)(A0+¯ x1A00)+A0 6= 0; therefore, the implicit function
theorem insures that we can write (9) locally as ¯ x1 = h(β) for some continuous function
h(·) with derivative h0 = −
c/β2
A0+(1+f0)(A0+x1A00) > 0. Substituting both of these continuous
functions into (8), we obtain:
πD(β) = h(β)[A(h(β) + f(h(β))) − c/β].
Since A(·) is continuous and since sums, products, and compositions of continuous func-
tions are continuous, πD is a continuous function of β in a neighborhood of any solution
(¯ x1,X−1,X) induced by β ∈ (β,1). Given this conclusion, there can be no β ∈ (β,1) where
πD is discontinuous. It follows that g(n,β) is continuous for β in the open interval (β,1).

Since g(n,β) = πD(β)−πC, we can diﬀerentiate to obtain the partial derivative, gβ(n,β)
anywhere in the open interval:
Proposition 8 gβ(n,β) > 0 for any β in (β,1).
17Proof: Since ¯ x1 > 0 for any β in (β,1), h(β) > 0. Recall that A0 < 0. Diﬀerentiating our
expression for g(n,β) and using (9) to simplify (an application of the envelope theorem) we
conclude that:
gβ(n,β) = h0[A + hA0 − c/β] + h[A0f0h0 + c/β2] = h[A0f0h0 + c/β2] > 0
for any β in (β,1).
We have shown that g(n,β) is continuous and strictly increasing in β in the open interval
(β,1) and g(n,β) = −πC for β ∈ [0,β]. The following lemma establishes that there is no
discontinuity at the boundary β = β.
Lemma 1 The function g(n,β) is continuous in β at the point β.
Proof: Since g(n,β) = −πC for β ∈ [0,β], it suﬃces to verify that limβ↓β g(n,β) =
limβ↓β(πD − πC) = −πC. But this follows from (8) since limβ↓β ¯ x1 = 0 and A is bounded.

We can therefore, conclude:
Proposition 9 If the partition indexed by n is stable for some β, then it is stable for all
smaller β.
Proof: This follows from Proposition 8. 
We now use the results above to prove the existence and uniqueness of a ‘threshold’
β(n) which separates stable from unstable partitions.
Proposition 10 For any n ≤ bN/2c, there exists a unique β(n) ∈ (β,1] such that for any
β < β(n), the partition indexed by n can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium,
while for β > β(n) the partition can never be supported.
Proof: For any given n, suppose that at β = 1, g ≤ 0. Then that partition can be
supported as an subgame-perfect equilibrium for any β ∈ (0,1] and we can deﬁne β(n) = 1.
Now suppose that at β = 1, g > 0. Then by continuity (Proposition 7), there will exist one
or more roots, β ∈ (0,1), such that g(n,β) = 0. Denote any root as β(n). Uniqueness of
β(n) then follows since g is strictly increasing (Proposition 8).
18This makes precise the intuitive notion that the socially optimal partnership partition
is stable if team production is “suﬃciently advantageous”: β needs to be smaller than
β(n∗). Alternatively, for any given β, β(n) also deﬁnes partnership partitions which are
stable:{n : β(n) ≤ β}.
Is the Partnership Solution always stable even when team production confers no ad-
vantage whatsoever(β = 1)? A single counterexample suﬃces to eliminate this possibility.
Recall the example introduced at the outset where N = 12 producers in an industry, each
with constant marginal cost of c = 3, face an inverse demand curve of P = 19 − X and
attempt to achieve monopoly proﬁts by dividing into n = 4 partnerships of equal size. It
is easily veriﬁed that for any β ≤ .39, full monopoly proﬁts ($64) can be achieved, but for
β > .39 the conﬁguration of four partnerships is unstable. There remains the possibility
that for at least some example satisfying our assumptions, the partnership solution is stable
even in the absence of advantages to team production. This seems unlikely since, in general,
a partition with fewer than n∗ partnerships can never be stable.15
4 Generalizations
Until now, we have assumed that no costs were shared within a partnership. We have also
assumed that no individual or partnership has the power to change the price of output. We
now relax both assumptions by reinterpreting our previous analysis. In addition, we show
15When β = 1, n < n
∗ is never stable. Recall that the only partitions we need consider are those where
partnerships diﬀer by at most one member and where eﬀort is shared equally among the partners. Pick
a partnership and designate someone as a potential deviator. Before going solo, he would earn exactly
the same payoﬀ as everyone else in his partnership; after going solo, he would earn at least as much as
his ex-partner(s) since he would eliminate free-riding and β = 1. If, for the sake of argument, he did not
strictly beneﬁt from going solo then (1) the payoﬀ of his ex-partners would likewise not increase and (2) the
payoﬀ of everyone else must strictly decrease. But then the sum of the payoﬀs would strictly decrease which
contradicts the fact that the aggregate proﬁt function is increasing in the number of partnerships to the left
of n
∗. An analogous argument establishes the strict proﬁtability (when β = 1) of a “marginal” deviation
in the neighborhood of n
∗ partnerships. See our earlier working paper: Heintzelman, Salant, and Schott
(2004).
19how partnerships can be valuable as a way to increase payoﬀs even when the ﬁrst-best is
unattainable.
Suppose we partition N homogeneous agents into n payoﬀ-sharing groups indexed by
i, each playing a simultaneous-move game. Assume agent k in group i chooses xik to
maximize 1
mi
h
xik + Y −k
i
i
· G(xik + Y −k
i + X−i) − cxik. If we make the same assumptions
about G(X) that we made about A(X) then we will get the corresponding results. So assume
that (1) G(X) is strictly positive, strictly decreasing, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable;
(2) G(0) − c > 0; and (3) the Novshek (1985) condition, G0(X) + XG00(X) < 0, holds for
all X ≥ 0. These assumptions are suﬃcient to insure the existence of a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in the simultaneous-move game. Because G(·) is downward-sloping, there is a
negative externality: agent k is adversely aﬀected by increases in X−i. We have derived
conditions suﬃcient for the aggregate payoﬀ, X(G(X) − c), to be maximized: provided
n∗ ≤ bN/2c and β < β(n∗), the optimum can be achieved by setting up n∗ partnerships
diﬀering in size by at most one member.
Suppose G(X) = A(X)−K, where K denotes cost per unit eﬀort for those costs shared
within the partnership. Then the Partnership Solution maximizes producer surplus. Since
price is constant, this maximizes social welfare as well.
Next suppose G(X) = P(f(X))A(X)−K, where P(·) is the industry price when aggre-
gate output f(X) is put on the market. This generalization ﬁts the case of the ﬁshermen of
Toyama Bay, who share some but not all costs and who use their partnerships not merely
to curb congestion but to raise price. Again, the Partnership Solution maximizes producer
surplus.
Finally, suppose G(X) = P(X) − K, where X is now interpreted as output and K
(respectively, c) as the cost per unit output rather than eﬀort, which is shared (respectively,
not shared) within the partnership. In this case, the Partnership Solution curbs excessive
output and permits a cartel to maximize proﬁts without any need for supergame strategies.
20In these last two cases, producer surplus is maximized but social welfare could be increased
by raising production. To see this, note that a marginal increase in production by anyone
would have no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on producer surplus but would strictly increase consumer
surplus.
In cases where β > β(n∗), the advantages of team production are insuﬃcient to achieve
the ﬁrst-best using the Partnership Solution. In such cases, a generalization of the Partner-
ship Solution can nonetheless lead to a second-best equilibrium with a large increase in the
aggregate payoﬀ. To illustrate, recall the example where N = 12,c = 3, and G(X) = 19−X.
In that case n∗ = 4 and β = .39. Suppose as in our earlier example that β = .56 > .39. Then
dividing the agents into four partnerships of equal size is not feasible since each member
would have an incentive to go solo. However, if the 12 agents are divided into six part-
nerships of equal size, then industry proﬁt is $54.12—not the ﬁrst-best level of $64 but
approximately triple the result in the oligopoly (or common property) solution.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the viability of the Partnership Solution to the common property
problem and showed that this proposal was also a potential solution to the problem of
organizing a cartel to achieve monopoly proﬁts. The Japanese ﬁshermen who have formed
partnerships to pool the revenues (and some costs) from their various vessels report that
their goal is to reduce congestion and raise price. These are, in fact, the consequences to
be expected from partnerships.
We showed that the Partnership Solution suﬀers from a single weakness: the tempta-
tion to ﬂee one’s free-riding partners and go solo. Going solo is sometimes infeasible for
technological or legal reasons. Even when it is feasible, however, going solo ceases to be
as attractive when there are substantial beneﬁts from team production or substantial ﬁxed
21costs of setting up a private practice (oﬃce rent, support staﬀ to handle billing and third
party reimbursement, etc.). In such circumstances, the Partnership Solution can sometimes
be used to maximize the aggregate payoﬀ.
Throughout, we assumed that a partnership had to admit every applicant. It might have
been more realistic to assume that members of an existing partnership could deny admission
to anyone if opposition to him within the partnership was “suﬃciently widespread.” This
change in assumption would in fact have increased the scope of the Partnership Solution.
For, every solution we identiﬁed as stable would continue to be stable since no one in such
solutions has any incentive to join an existing partnership even when assured of admission.
But partitions we identiﬁed as unstable under our old assumption would become stable
under this new assumption. To illustrate, suppose going solo was infeasible and we set up n∗
non-solo partnerships some of which diﬀered by two or more members. Such an arrangement
could not achieve the ﬁrst-best under our old assumption because every member of the
largest partnership would deviate unilaterally to a smaller partnership with less free-riding.
But this same arrangement would achieve the ﬁrst-best under the new assumption since
admitting him would be blocked unanimously by existing members who anticipated that
expanding the number of partners would stimulate free-riding and would lower each of their
payoﬀs. In assuming that no applicant could be rejected by existing members, therefore,
we understated the usefulness of partnerships in solving the common-property and cartel
problems.
Our conclusions contain both good and bad news. The good news is that partnerships
can eliminate all or much of the deadweight loss associated with the common property prob-
lem. The bad news is that they can also eliminate all or much of the loss in monopoly proﬁts
experienced by cartels. Anti-trust authorities would be well-advised to take our analysis
into account when investigating professions where ﬁrms are organized as partnerships.
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